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DOWNWARD NOMINAL WAGE RIGIDITY: THE 
IMPLICATIONS FROM A NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 
 





  We study the determinants of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity 
(DNWR) in the context of a new-Keynesian heterogeneous-agent model. Labor 
productivity of agents is subject to perfectly insurable idiosyncratic shocks. 
Wage contracts are signed one period ahead and specify the minimum wage 
that the firm should pay to each worker conditional on her future expected 
marginal product. The model predicts a simple structural equation: the degrees 
of DNWR are entirely determined by unexpected shocks to technology and 
money supply. We test this model's implication with data on the U.S. economy, 
and we find that the above two shocks can account for about 60% of variation in 
the aggregate measures of DNWR. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The hypothesis of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity (DNWR) states that
degrees of rigidity are higher when nominal wages are adjusted downward
than upward. There is robust statistical evidence in support of this hypothe-
sis: the wage-change distribution in actual economies is found to be skewed to
the right due to a relative shortage of nominal wage cuts (see, e.g., McLaugh-
lin, 1994, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry, 1996, Kahn, 1997). A possible reason
for the existence of DNWR is behavioral speciﬁcities of the real-world agents:
employers are reluctant to cut nominal wages because they believe that this
damages workers morale (see, e.g., Bewley 1998 and Howitt 2002) and em-
ployees are reluctant to accept the nominal wage cuts because they perceive
them as unfair (see, e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986, and Shaﬁr,
Diamond and Tversky 1997).
A large body of the empirical literature studies the issue of DNWR in the
context of the traditional Keynesian model, see Kramarz (2001) for a sur-
vey. According to this model, inﬂation facilitates labor-market adjustment
by speeding the downward nominal wage changes, so that there is a Phillips-
curve trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment. As a consequence, the
asymmetry in the wage-change distribution should become more (less) pro-
nounced when inﬂation declines (increases). This is precisely the implication
that is tested in the empirical studies, see, e.g., Card and Hyslop (1997),
Groshen and Schweitzer (1997), Fehr and Goette (1999), Smith (2000).
A potential shortcoming of the above literature is that it relies mainly
on statistical models postulated from general considerations rather then on
structural models derived from micro foundations.1 In particular, the postu-
lated inverse relation between the extent of DNWR and inﬂation is subject to
Lucas (1972) type of critique. That is, if agents have rational expectations,
they will forecast inﬂation and will take it into account when signing the
wage contracts. For instance, if an economy experiences systematic inﬂation
of 10%, the next period contractual wage will be adjusted by 10% upward,
so that the extent of DNWR will be exactly the same as in the economy
with zero inﬂation. This implies that expected inﬂation should not have
any eﬀect on the extent of wage rigidities but only unexpected one. Thus,
1The theoretical literature on asymmetric (downward) wage rigidities is relatively scarce
(see Elsby, 2004). The papers that develop dynamic general-equilibrium models of wage
rigidity focus exclusively on the symmetric case, i.e., when wages are equally rigid upward
and downward (see, e.g., Benassy, 1995, Cooley and Hansen, 1995, Shimer, 2003).
2rather than looking at degrees of DNWR in low and high inﬂation periods,
it would be more reasonable to look at how degrees of DNWR vary with
unexpected changes in inﬂation. However, even unexpected inﬂation may be
not the right explanatory variable for DNWR. What is an appropriate set
of explanatory variables should be determined by a structural model. For
example, in a general-equilibrium context, the explanatory variables will be
the state variables, whereas inﬂation will be determined endogenously.
In this paper, we derive a structural model of DNWR on the basis of a
new-Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium setup with heterogeneous agents.
We assume two sources of heterogeneity: initial endowments of wealth and
idiosyncratic labor-productivity shocks. Apart from idiosyncratic shocks,
there are also shocks to the aggregate level of technology and to money sup-
ply. Markets are complete, so that agents can insure themselves against
all kinds of uncertainty. The production side of our economy consists of a
representative ﬁrm that produces output from two production inputs, capi-
tal and labor. Wage contracts are signed one period ahead and specify the
minimum wage that the ﬁrm should pay to each worker conditional on her
future expected marginal product. To ensure that the ﬁrm does not make
systematic losses due to DNWR, we assume that contractual wages of all
workers are rescaled down such that the expected proﬁti sz e r o ,w h i c hi s
consistent with a competitive environment. Our analysis relies essentially
on two assumptions: ﬁrst, the original growing economy follows a balanced
growth path and, second, the associated stationary economy has a unique
recursive Markov equilibrium with the aggregate state space which includes
the aggregate level of wealth but not the wealth distribution.
We show analytically that a fraction of the population aﬀected by DNWR
in our model is fully determined by unexpected shocks to money supply and
technology. There is a simple intuition behind this result. In a competi-
tive environment, the ﬁrm sets wages to ensure expected zero proﬁt. If a
money-supply shock and a technology shock happen to be equal to their ex-
pectations, an exactly half of agents will experience DNWR. (This is because
idiosyncratic innovations are assumed to be Normally distributed, so that a
half of agents will have marginal products which are lower than the expected
ones). However, if technology or money supply grows more than expected,
the market clearing wages increase relative to the contractual ones, so that
the extent of DNWR reduces.
We test the implications of the model with U.S. data. First, we con-
struct several unexpected technology innovations and money-supply inno-
3vations from Solow residuals and money supply. Second, we construct two
aggregate measures of DNWR such as the skewness coeﬃcient and the mean-
median diﬀerence of the wage-change distribution by using the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) data. Finally, we regress the aggregate mea-
sures of DNWR on unexpected changes in technology and money supply.
We ﬁnd that the results of the regression depend signiﬁcantly on the mea-
sure of money supply used. The model has virtually no explanatory power
under money supply given by M1, it can explain about 30% of variation in
the aggregate measures of DNWR under M2 and it can account for about
60% of the variation in the aggregate measures of DNWR under M3. In the
last case, we have a very good ﬁt of the model, which is surprising given the
ﬁnding of the previous literature that macro evidence of DNWR is fragile
(see, e.g., Elsby, 2004, for a discussion).
An important question to be answered is how one can explain an inverse
relation between degrees of DNWR and inﬂa t i o nd o c u m e n t e db yt h ee m p i r -
ical literature (Card and Hyslop, 1997, Groshen and Schweitzer, 1997, etc.)
in the context of our model To answer this question, we extend our baseline
regression equation to include ad hoc an additional explanatory variable, in-
ﬂation rate. We ﬁnd that, in the absence of unexpected shocks to technology
and money supply, the inﬂation rate is statistically signiﬁcant for explaining
the DNWR , however, once such shocks are introduced, the inﬂation rate
becomes statistically insigniﬁcant. Our results indicate that an inverse em-
pirical relation between degrees of DNWR and inﬂation, documented by the
previous literature, arises because the relevant explanatory variables, such as
the unexpected shocks to technology and money supply, were omitted.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formulates the the-
oretical model and derives the structural equation to be estimated. Section
3 describes the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The theoretical framework
Time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite, t ∈ T,w h e r eT = {0,1,2,...}.
The economy consists of the government, a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived het-
erogeneous consumers and a representative ﬁrm. The consumers’ names are
in the set I, which is normalized to one by
R
I di =1 , so that average and
aggregate quantities coincide. We denote variables of agent i by superscript
"i", and we use variables without superscript to denote aggregate quantities.
4T h e r ea r et h r e et y p e so fs h o c k si nt h ee c o n o m y ,t h ea g g r e g a t em o n e y -
supply shock, mt, the aggregate labor-productivity shock, zt, and the idio-
syncratic labor-productivity shock, bi
t. We model the aggregate shocks in
the way which is standard for the real business cycle literature, namely, by
postulating two properties, deterministic growth and stochastic cycles. To
be speciﬁc, we assume that the money-supply shock mt follows
log(mt)=l o g ( m−1)+tlog(γ
















is a Normally distributed error term. Similarly,
we assume that the aggregate labor-productivity shock zt follows
log(zt)=l o g ( z−1)+tlog(γ





where γz > 1 is the rate of aggregate labor productivity growth; 0 <ρ θ < 1






is a Normally distrib-
uted error term. Concerning the idiosyncratic shocks, we assume that labor




























ªi∈I,a r eg i v e n .
Ar e p r e s e n t a t i v eﬁrm owns a technology for producing a single output
commodity from two production inputs, capital, kt−1,a n dl a b o r ,ht.T h e
technology is described by a production function f : R2
+ → R+,w h i c hh a s
constant returns to scale, is strictly increasing in both arguments, contin-
uously diﬀerentiable, strictly concave, and satisﬁes the appropriate Inada
conditions. The output level depends also on the current aggregate labor
productivity zt,a c c o r d i n gt of (kt−1,z tht). Under the assumption (2), zt can
be interpreted as a stochastic labor-augmenting technological progress.
Wage contracts between the ﬁrm and workers are signed in period t − 1.
The ﬁrm commits to pay each agent nominal wage, which is at least as
high as her expected t-period nominal wage. Thus, nominal wages are rigid
5downwards. To avoid systematic losses from wage rigidities, the ﬁrm re-
scales down the nominal wages of all agents by a factor of ξt−1 ≥ 1.2 In
a competitive environment, the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm, expected in period t − 1,






=0 ,w h i c hi d e n t i ﬁes the value of











































where pt, rt and wi
t are the t-period nominal price of output, nominal interest










t being capital and labor of agent i.
Consumers are heterogeneous in two dimensions, namely, initial endow-
ments of wealth and labor productivity. The consumers save in the form of
capital and money, and they supply their labor to production. Our subse-
quent analysis is not directly linked to any speciﬁc model of the consumer’s
behavior, for example, we can consider a variant of Sidrovski’s model where
money enters the utility function (see, e.g., Benassy, 1995), or we can con-
sider a variant of the cash-in-advance model where money are needed for
purchasing consumption goods (see, e.g., Lucas and Stockey, 1983, 1987).
Therefore, we do not elaborate a description of the consumer’s side here but
rather state the assumptions that should be satisﬁed for our economy.
A1. In equilibrium, the economy follows a balanced growth path, where
real variables grow at the rate γz, nominal variables grow at the rate γm,a n d
labor grows at a zero rate.
2In the absence of DNWR, wages of all agents are equal to their marginal products
of labor, so that the equilibrium proﬁt is equal to zero under ξt−1 =1 .H o w e v e r , w i t h
DNWR, the value of ξt−1 =1leads to negative proﬁts: agents who are not aﬀected by
wage rigidities are paid their marginal products of labor while those who are aﬀected by
wage rigidities are paid more than their marginal products.
3While the expected proﬁt is equal to zero by construction, the eﬀective proﬁtc a n
be either positive or negative or zero depending on the realization of aggregate shocks in
period t.I ft h ee ﬀective proﬁt is non-zero, it is distributed among the ﬁrm’s shareholders
in the form of dividends.
6A2. The associated stationary economy has a unique recursive Markov









where xt−1 is a vector of t-period aggregate state variables whose values are
k n o w ni np e r i o dt − 1.
To ensure that real variables grow at the same rate and labor exposes no
long-run growth, as implied by A1, we are to impose suﬃcient restrictions
on preferences and technology, see King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988). A bal-
anced growth of nominal variables can be achieved under general assumptions
(see, e.g., Cooley and Hansen, 1995). The assumption that t-period state
space does not include the wealth distribution, as postulated in A2,r e q u i r e s
to assume that markets are complete, i.e., that consumers can fully insure
themselves against uncertainty by trading state contingent claims (Arrow se-
curities). With this assumption, we can formulate the associated planner’s
problem and characterize the aggregate equilibrium allocation without keep-
ing track of the wealth distribution. The set xt−1 includes kt−1 and mt−1
(which are adjusted to growth, see Appendix) and possibly, such past vari-
ables as µt−1 and θt−1, because they determine the t−1-period expectations
of wages.4 In Appendix, we describe an example of the heterogeneous-agent
economy which satisﬁes our assumptions A1 and A2.
The problem (4) − (6) implies that if agent i is not aﬀected by wage






































around a steady state level. Speciﬁcally, wi
t can
4The presence of the past variables like µt−1 and θt−1 in the state space of period t
is standard for models with nominal rigidities, see Cooley and Hansen (1995) for another
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is the ﬁrst-order partial derivative of logW with respect to the
variable logxt evaluated in the steady state; and b xt ≡ xt−x
x is the percentage
deviation of the corresponding variable from the steady state.
Let us next compute the diﬀerence between the individual wage (9) and
its expected value at t − 1, i.e., ∆wi
t ≡ log(wi





















































t is negative, an agent experiences DNWR because for such an agent
we have log(wi
t) <E t−1 [log(wi
t)]. A log-linear approximation of a ﬁrst-
order autoregressive process of the form log(xt)=ρx log(xt−1)+εx
t yields
b xt = ρxb xt−1 + εx
t and Et−1 (b xt)=ρxb xt−1. Furthermore, with a continuum of




















tdi =0 . Hence, under the assumptions





















t +  
i
t. (11)
We now deﬁne a simple aggregate measure of DNWR, which is a fraction



















































































t ≥ 0 is an indicator function; and F is the
cumulative density function of a Normally distributed variable with a zero
mean and a unit variance.







































w h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a tF (0) = 1
2 and F 0 (0) = 1. Assuming that the aver-














































decreases monotonically with positive in-
novations to money supply and technology.
There is a simple economic intuition behind the results (13) and (14).




t =0 ), exactly a half of population is aﬀe c t e db yD N W R .W eh a v eo n e
half because the error term,  i
t, in the process of idiosyncratic shocks (3) is
drawn from a Normal distribution with a zero mean: after the realization
of shock in t, a half of agents has labor productivity which is higher (lower)
than was expected in t − 1, when the wage contracts were set. If there is
a positive technological innovation, εθ
t > 0, then the t-period distribution of
labor productivity shifts to the right, as compared to one expected in t − 1,
9s ot h a tt h ef r a c t i o no fp o p u l a t i o na ﬀected by DNWR goes down. In a similar
way, if there is a positive money-supply innovation (unexpected inﬂation),
εθ
t > 0, then the t-period distribution of market-clearing nominal wages shifts
to the right, as compared to one expected in t−1, so that again, the fraction
of population aﬀected by DNWR reduces. Clearly, the largest reduction in
t h ef r a c t i o no fp o p u l a t i o na ﬀected by DNWR should be observed if positive
innovations to money-supply and technology happen simultaneously.
3 Empirical analysis
In this section, we use the data on the U.S. economy to test the model’s
predictions concerning the time-series behavior of aggregate measures of
DNWR. According to our model, the degree of such wage rigidity should
increase whenever the economy faces negative innovations to money supply
or technology. We therefore attempt to establish whether this prediction is
in agreement with the data and which of the above two innovations is more
important for explaining ﬂuctuations in aggregate measures of DNWR.
Our empirical analysis is based on result (13) which implies a simple
regression equation for the constructed aggregate measure of DNWR




t +  t, (15)
where β0,β 1,β 2 are the regression coeﬃcients and  t ∼ N (0,σ2
 ) is an error
term.
I n f o r m a t i o no nw h e t h e re a c hg i v e na g e n ti sa ﬀected by wage rigidity is not
provided in household data, so that we cannot compute the aggregate mea-
sure (12),w h i c hi saf r a c t i o no fp o p u l a t i o na ﬀected by DNWR. We consider
two alternative aggregate measures, which are standardly used in the liter-
ature, namely, the skewness coeﬃcient and the diﬀerence between the mean
and median of the wage-change distribution. Concerning the ﬁrst measure,
one would expect the skewness coeﬃcient to be zero, if the distribution of
wage changes is symmetric. For a distribution where negative wage changes
happen less frequently than positive ones (i.e., skewed to the right) this co-
eﬃcient should be positive. One serious problem with the skewness statistic
is that it is extremely sensitive to observations in the tails of the distrib-
ution (see Lebow, Stockton, Washer, 1995, for a discussion). Our second
measure, the diﬀerence between the mean and median, is less sensitive to
outliers because the eﬀect of extreme observations is limited to the mean
10(see, McLaughlin, 1994). The diﬀerence between mean and median consti-
tutes the sign-test statistic: the higher is its value, the more likely is the
wage-change distribution to be skewed to the right.
To construct the above aggregate measures of DNWR in the U.S. econ-
omy, we use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) which provides
the relevant information about 53,000 individuals over the 1968-1992 period.
We restrict our attention to a sub-sample of agents who receive labor in-
come only. Furthermore, we exclude from the sample agents for whom the
data on labor income or hours worked were missing. As a result, the initial
sample was reduced to about 5,000 individuals per year. For each agent in
the obtained sample, we compute the wage as a ratio of labor income to the
total hours worked. We provide the two constructed aggregate measures of
DNWR in Table 1.










t=1, respectively. To do so, we re-write the processes for
money-supply shocks (1) and technology shocks (2) in a way convenient for
estimation,
log(mt)=η0 + η1 log(mt−1)+η2t + ε
µ
t , (16)
log(zt)=v0 + v1 log(zt−1)+v2t + ε
z
t, (17)
where η0 ≡ log(m−1)(1− ρm)+ρm log(γm); η1 ≡ ρm, η2 ≡ (1 − ρm)log(γm);
and v0 ≡ log(z−1)(1− ρz)+ρz log(γz), v1 ≡ ρz, v2 ≡ (1 − ρz)log(γz).
To compute the series for innovations in money-supply equation (16),w e
consider three alternative measures of money supply, such as M1, M2 and M3.
We take the data on money supply from the web-site of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Saint Louis at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. To compute the
series for technological innovations in process (17),w eu s ef o u ra l t e r n a t i v e
measures of Solow residuals constructed in Zimmermann (1994) and pro-
vided at http://ideas.repec.org/zimm/data/voldata.html. The four measures
are constructed from output, employment and capital (SRoec), from output,
total hours and capital (SRohc), from output and employment (SRoe) and
from output and total hours (SRoh). We estimate equations (16) and (17) by
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) under the heteroskedasticity-robust residuals
option. The regression results are provided in Tables 2 and 3. The large
R2-coeﬃcients show a high explanatory power of all the regressions.







t=1968 to estimate re-
gression equation (15). Since both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
11Table 1. Mean-median difference of log wage changes in PSID dataset  
 
Period Skewness  Mean-median  difference 
1968-69 0.4461  0.0344 
1969-70 0.7267  0.0299 
1970-71 0.6160  0.0722 
0971-72 -0.5190  -0.0079 
1972-73 0.2806  0.0230 
1973-74 0.0662  0.0102 
1974-75 -0.0515  0.0082 
1975-76 0.1342  0.0093 
1976-77 0.0713  0.0117 
1977-78 -0.0276  0.0099 
1978-79 0.1777  0.0150 
1979-80 0.1258  0.0247 
1980-81 -0.1012  -0.0042 
1981-82 0.0451  0.0048 
1982-83 -0.0887  -0.0021 
1983-84 0.1029  0.0046 
1984-85 -0.0040  0.0058 
1985-86 0.0114  0.0060 
1986-87 -0.0628  0.0035 
1987-88 0.1048  0.0133 
1988-89 0.0631  0.0104 
1989-90 0.0329  0.0033 
1990-91 0.0796  0.0053 






Table 2. Parameters of the process for monetary shocks  
 





MS1  2 R =0.9975 
2





MS2  2 R =0.9985 
2





MS3  2 R =0.9985 
2
. adj R =0.9983 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent levels, 
respectively. Number of observations is 24.  
 Table 3. Parameters of the process for technology shocks  
 





SRoec  2 R =0.8692 
2





SRoeh  2 R =0.9171 
2





SRoc  2 R =0.9873 
2





SRoh  2 R =0. 0.9937 
2
. adj R =0.9931 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent 
levels, respectively. Number of observations is 24. SRoec is Solow residuals from output, employment and capital; 
SRoeh is Solow residuals from output, total hours and capital; SRoc is Solow residuals from output and employment; 
SRoh is Solow residuals from output and total hours. 
 
 were present in the OLS regressions, we also provide standard errors com-
puted by Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS). By construction, FGLS
delivers the same coeﬃcients as OLS does, however, it yields lower standard
errors. The results for the skewness coeﬃcient and the mean-median dif-
ference of the wage-change distribution are provided in Table 4 and Table
5, respectively. In each table, column 1 speciﬁes the estimation method
(OLS, FGLS); column 2 states the measure of money supply (M1, M2, M3);
and columns 3-10 provide the estimated coeﬃcients β1 and β2 as well as R2
and adjusted R2 (denoted by R2
adj) under four alternative measures of Solow
residuals (SRoec, SRohc, SRoe, SRoh). For each measure of Solow residuals
considered, we run three alternative regressions, one with technology shocks
only (i.e., under the restriction β1 =0 ), another with money-supply shocks
only (i.e., under the restriction β2 =0 ) and the other with both technology
and money-supply shocks (i.e., under no restrictions).
We now discuss the estimation results obtained with the skewness coef-
ﬁcient as a dependent variable. As follows from Table 4, all the estimated
coeﬃcients are negative, which is consistent with the model’s prediction that
negative money-supply and technology innovations increase the aggregate
amount of DNWR. As we see from the upper row of the table, technology
innovations alone cannot explain variation in the aggregate measure of wage
rigidities considered: under restriction β1 =0 ,t h ec o e ﬃcient β2 is statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant, R2 is extremely low, and R2
adj is negative.
When money-supply shocks are introduced (i.e., β1 6=0 ), the results
depend crucially on the measure of money-supply used. To be speciﬁc, the
explanatory power of M1 innovations is again very low: under the restriction
β2 =0 ,t h ec o e ﬃcient β1 is statistically insigniﬁcant, R2 is low, and R2
adj
is negative. Furthermore, allowing for both technology and M1 innovations
does not almost increase the explanatory power of the regression.
Considering M2, as a measure of money supply, improves the results con-
siderably: the coeﬃcient on M1 is signiﬁcant at a 1% level, and innovations
to M2 can account for about R2 ≈ 30% of variation in our aggregate mea-
sure of wage rigidities. Adding technology innovations to the regression does
not improve the results compared to M2 innovations alone: the adjusted R2
adj
actually decreases, and the coeﬃcient on technology innovations is not sig-
niﬁcant.
M3 is the measure of money supply that proved to have the highest ex-
planatory power: the innovations to M3 account for R2 ≈ 53% of variation
in our aggregate measure of wage rigidities. Surprisingly, technology inno-
15Table 4. Regression results: the skewness coefficient is a dependent variable 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * and ` indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, 10-and 
15-percent levels, respectively. Number of observations is 24. The years considered are from 1969 to 1992. 
 
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
SRoec SRohc  SRoe  SRoh 
β1  β2  β1  β2  β1  β2  β1  β2 
-  -3.727 
(7.592)  -  -4.860 
(7.004)  -   -4.667 
(8.598)  -  - 12.400 
(12.669) 
2 R =0.0108 
2
. adj R =-0.0341 
2 R = 0.0214 
2
. adj R = -0.0231 
2 R =0.0132 
2
. adj R =-0.0316 
2 R =0.0417 
2
. adj R = -0.0018 
-0.474 
(2.139)  -  -0.474 
(2.139)  -  -0.474 
(2.139)  -  -0.474 
(2.139)  - 
2 R = 0.0022 
2
. adj R =-0.0431 
2 R = 0.0022 
2
. adj R =-0.0431 
2 R = 0.0022 
2
. adj R =-0.0431 
2 R = 0.0022 
2


















2 R =0.0112 
2
. adj R =-0.0830 
2 R = 0.0214 
2
. adj R =-0.0718 
2 R = 0.0135 
2
. adj R =-0.0804 
 
2 R = 0.0437 
2





















(1.890)  -  -5.701*** 
(1.890)  -  -5.701*** 
(1.890)  -  -5.701*** 
(1.890)  - 
2 R = 0.2925 
2
. adj R =0.2603 
2 R = 0.2925 
2
. adj R =0.2603 
2 R = 0.2925 
2
. adj R =0.2603 
2 R = 0.2925 
2


















2 R = 0.3077 
2
. adj R =0.2417 
2 R =0.3095 
2
. adj R =0.2437 
2 R =0.3017 
2
. adj R =0.2352 
2 R = 0.3093 
2




















(1.387)  -  -6.913*** 
(1.387)  -  -6.913*** 
(1.387)  -  -6.913*** 
(1.387)  - 
2 R =0.5303 
2
. adj R =0.5089 
2 R =0. 5303 
2
. adj R =0.5089 
2 R =0.5303 
2
. adj R =0.5089 
2 R =0.5303 
2


















2 R = 0.5895 
2
. adj R =0.5504 
2 R = 0.5650 
2
. adj R =  0.5695 
2 R =0.5712 
2
. adj R =0.5303 
2 R =0.5898 
2


















(7.947) Table 5. Regression results: the mean-median difference is a dependent variable 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * and ` indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, 10-and 
15-percent levels, respectively. Number of observations is 24. The years considered are from 1969 to 1992. 
1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8 9  10 
SRoec SRohc  SRoe  SRoh 
β1  β2  β1  β2  β1  β2  Β1  β2 
-  -0.188 
(0.507)  -  -0.249 
( 0.469)  -   -.277 
(0.571)  -  0.284 
(0.860) 
2 R =0.0000 
2
. adj R =-0.0454 
2 R = 0.0127 
2
. adj R = -0.0322 
2 R = 0.0106 
2
. adj R =-0.0343 
2 R =0.0049 
2
. adj R = -0.0403 
-0.036 
(  0.142)  -  -0.036 
(  0.142)  -  -0.036 
(  0.142)  -  -0.036 
(  0.142)  - 
2 R = 0.0030 
2
. adj R =-0.0423 
2 R = 0.0030 
2
. adj R =-0.0423 
2 R = 0.0030 
2
. adj R =-0.0423 
2 R = 0.0030 
2


















2 R =0.0108 
2
. adj R =-0.0834 
2 R =  0.0195 
2
. adj R =-0.0738 
2 R = 0.0161 
2
. adj R =-0.0776 
2 R = 0.0490 
2





















(0.109)  -  -0.368*** 
(0.109)  -  -0.368*** 
( 0.109)  -  -0.368*** 
(0.109)  - 
2 R = 0.3200 
2
. adj R = 0.2891 
2 R = 0.3200 
2
. adj R = 0.2891 
2 R = 0.3200 
2
. adj R = 0.2891 
2 R = 0.3200 
2


















2 R = 0.3441 
2
. adj R =0.2816 
2 R =  0.3445 
2
. adj R =  0.2821 
2 R =0.3528 
2
. adj R =0.2911 
2 R =0.3817 
2




















(0.123)  -  -0.397*** 
(0.123)  -  -0.397*** 
( 0.123)  -  -0.397*** 
( 0.123)  - 
2 R =0.3391 
2
. adj R =0.3090 
2 R =0.3391 
2
. adj R =0.3090 
2 R =0.3391 
2
. adj R =0.3090 
2 R =0.3391 
2


















2 R = 0.3827 
2
. adj R = 0.3239 
2 R =0.3720 
2
. adj R = 0.3122 
2 R =0.3971 
2
. adj R =0.3397 
2 R = 0.4059 
2
















 ( 0.112) 
-1.210** 
 (0.650) vations become also important if introduced together with M3 innovations:
under three measures of Solow residuals out of four considered, the coeﬃcient
on technology innovations is signiﬁcant at a 5% level, and R2 increases to
59% (R2
adj increases from 51% up to 57%).
As is seen from Table 5, the estimation results with the mean-median
diﬀerence as a dependent variable, are similar to those with the skewness
coeﬃcient, although the ﬁt of the model is generally lower. Again, the model
with both M3 and technology innovations has the highest explanatory power:
it yields R2 ≈ 37% − 41% (R2
adj ≈ 31% − 35%). The coeﬃcient on M3 inno-
v a t i o n si ss i g n i ﬁcant at a 1% level, while that on technology innovations is
signiﬁcant at 5 − 15%, depending on the measure of Solow residuals consid-
ered.
There is an important issue related to our discussion. Recall that empir-
ical literature (Card and Hyslop, 1997, Groshen and Schweitzer, 1997, etc.)
provides evidence of an inverse relation between degrees of DNWR and inﬂa-
tion, while our model predicts that the only determinants of the degrees of
DNWR are unexpected shocks to technology and money supply. To investi-
gate this issue, we extend our baseline regression equation (15) to include ad
hoc an additional explanatory variable, inﬂation rate. To compute the inﬂa-
tion rate, we use the Consumer’s Price Index for all urban consumers, which
we download from the web-site of the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis.
The regression results for the skewness coeﬃcient and the mean-median dif-
ference are provided in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. In the tables, β3 denotes
the coeﬃcient on the inﬂation rate. We ﬁrst consider regressions of our two
aggregate measures of DNWR on a constant and the inﬂation rate. Similar
to the previous literature, we observe some evidence of an inverse relation
between degrees of DNWR and inﬂation: when the DNWR is measured by
the skewness coeﬃcient, the inﬂation rate coeﬃcient, β3,i ss i g n i ﬁcant at a
15% level, and when the DNWR is measured by the mean-median diﬀer-
ence, β3 is signiﬁcant at a 10% level (see the upper rows of Tables 6 and
7, respectively). We subsequently re-run the regressions reported in Tables
4 and 5 by adding the explanatory variable, inﬂation rate. We ﬁnd that in
the presence of unexpected shocks to technology and money supply, the in-
ﬂation rate coeﬃcient is highly insigniﬁcant. The above results suggest that
an inverse relation between degrees of DNWR and inﬂation, found by the
empirical literature, could be a consequence of omitting relevant explanatory




Table 6. Regression results with inflation rate: the skewness coefficient is a dependent variable. 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * and ` indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, 10-and 15-percent levels, respectively. Number of observations is 24. The years considered are 
from 1969 to 1992. 
 
1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11 12  13 14 
Sroec SRohc Sroe  Sroh 

























2 R = 0.1065 
2
. adj R = 0.0659 
2 R = 0.1065 
2
. adj R = 0.0659 
2 R = 0.1065 
2
. adj R = 0.0659 
2 R = 0.1065 
2


























2 R = 0.1107 
2
. adj R = 0.0253 
2 R = 0.1089 
2
. adj R = 0.0249 
2 R = 0.1083 
2
. adj R = 0.0251 
2 R = 0.1145 
2





















































2 R = 0.3345 
2
. adj R =0.2347 
2 R =  0.3170 
2
. adj R =  0.2145 
2 R = 0.3153 
2
. adj R =0.2126 
2 R =0.2926 
2






















 ( 1.815) 





























2 R = 0.6179 
2
. adj R = 0.5606 
2 R =0.6007 
2
. adj R = 0.5408 
2 R =0.6073 
2
. adj R =0.5483 
2 R = 0.5769 
2





























Table 7. Regression results with inflation rate: the mean-median difference is a dependent variable.  
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * and ` indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, 10-and 15-percent levels, respectively. Number of observations is 24. The years considered are 
from 1969 to 1992. 
 
1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11 12  13 14 
Sroec SRohc Sroe  Sroh 

























2 R = 0.1318 
2
. adj R = 0.0923 
2 R = 0.1318 
2
. adj R = 0.0923 
2 R = 0.1318 
2
. adj R = 0.0923 
2 R = 0.1318 
2


























2 R = 0.1478 
2
. adj R = 0.0354 
2 R =  0.1602 
2
. adj R = 0.0368 
2 R = 0.1531 
2
. adj R = 0.0332 
2 R = 0.1866 
2





















































2 R = 0.4046 
2
. adj R =0.3153 
2 R =  0.3445 
2
. adj R =  0.2821 
2 R =0.4139 
2
. adj R =0.3259 
2 R =0.4116 
2




















































2 R = 0.3984 
2
. adj R = 0.3081 
2 R =0.3955 
2
. adj R = 0.3048 
2 R =0.4180 
2
. adj R =0.3307 
2 R = 0.4341 
2


























(0.001) 4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of DNWR in the context
of a new-Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
agents. According to our model, the time-series behavior of the aggregate
measures of DNWR can be fully described by unexpected changes in money
s u p p l ya n di nt e c h n o l o g y .W eﬁnd that this implication of the model accords
well with U.S. data under the M3 measure of money-supply shocks. In par-
ticular, our simple regression model with only two explanatory variables can
account for about 60% of variation in the skewness coeﬃcient of the wage-
change distribution. The so-high ﬁt of our model is surprising given that the
previous literature, testing the Phillips curve implications of DNWR, does
not ﬁnd strong macroeconomic evidence of DNWR.
We should ﬁnally mention shortcomings and possible extensions of our
analysis. First, in order to derive a structural model, we use a log-linear
approximation. This would be an accurate procedure if all shocks were
relatively small, like the aggregate money-supply and technology shocks.
However, we also have idiosyncratic labor-productivity shocks which are
potentially large, and thus, non-linearities are potentially important. Un-
fortunately, there is no easy way of extending our analysis to higher-order
approximations. Second, our empirical analysis is limited to econometric es-
timation of the structural model. It would be also of interest to study the
implications of a calibrated version of the model, especially, those concerning
labor market. Finally, our model does not provide an economic justiﬁcation
for DNWR but only a psychological one, namely, the loss-aversion of both
managers and workers which makes it impossible to renegotiate wages down,
even though DNWR is distortionary and welfare-reducing. Thus, the next
step should be to develop a testable micro-macro model, where DNWR arises
endogenously, as an optimal choice of rational economic agents.
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5 Appendix
In this section, we present an example of the heterogeneous-agent economy
which satisﬁes the assumptions A1 and A2 in the main text.









µt−1 denotes the t-period growth rate of money supply, as implied
by (1). The government distributes the newly printed money among agents
proportionally to their previous-period money holdings, so that a consumer
with mi




µt−1 units of money.
We assume that consumers hold money because they derive utility from
the real money holdings, as in, e.g., Benassy (1995). A consumer i solves the







































































t ≥ 0, ni








is given. Here, ci
t and mi
t are the agent’s i consumption and stock of money,
respectively; the total time endowment is normalized to one, so that ni
t and
1 − ni






nominal proﬁt paid to the agent;5 {ai
t (s)}s∈S is the agent’s portfolio of state
contingent claims, where S denotes the set of all possible states of the world;
the claim of type s ∈ S costs qt (s) in period t and pays one unit of consump-
tion good in period t +1if the state s ∈ S occurs and zero otherwise. The
utility function u is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing in each
argument and concave; δ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor; d ∈ (0,1] is the
depreciation rate of capital.
Deﬁnition: A competitive equilibrium in the economy (1) − (6), (18) −
(20) is deﬁned as a stochastic processes for the prices {rt,w i
t,p t,q t (s)}
s∈S,i∈I
t∈T ,











t∈T such that given the prices:
5We do not specify how proﬁt sa r ed i s t r i b u t e da c r o s sa g e n t ss i n c ew ed on o ts o l v e

































t∈T solves the proﬁt-maximization problem (4) − (6);
(iii) all markets clear and the economy’s resource constraint is satisﬁed.
The First-Order Conditions (FOCs) with respect to state contingent claims,














































































t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with budget constraint (20);
and Π{st+1 = s0 | st = s}s,s0∈S is the transitional probability function.
By summing the individual budget constraints (20) across agents, by im-
























































is a set of the welfare weights
assigned by the planner to the individual utilities.
Proposition 1 There exists a set of welfare weights
©
λ
iªi∈I such that the
equilibrium in the heterogeneous-agent economy (1) − (6), (18) − (20) is de-
scribed by the planner’s problem (27), (26), (5) and (6).
25Proof. FOC (21) implies that the marginal utilities of any two agents
i,i0 ∈ I are constant across time and states of nature. With this result, we









t+1 = ...,a n dw e
can represent the agent’s Lagrange multipliers as λ
i
t = λt/λ
i for all i ∈ I.
By substituting the last formula into FOCs (22)−(25), we obtain the FOCs
of the planner’s problem with λt being the Lagrange multiplier associated
with resource constraint (26). The above equivalence of the FOCs proves the
statement of the proposition.
We now show a particular set of restrictions on preferences and technol-
ogy, under which the planner’s economy (27), (26), (5) and (6) is consis-
tent with balanced growth of both real and nominal variables. Let us as-






















1−τ with τ>0,τ6=1 , φ>0,









¢1−α with α ∈ (0,1). These assumptions
insure the existence of the balanced growth path.
In order to remove growth in the nominal and real quantities, we use





















(γm)t(γz)t, e πt = πt
(γm)t(γz)t, e pt =
pt
(γm)t and e rt = rt
(γm)t.T h e n ,













































































where e δ ≡ δ (γz)















26Note that the resulting economy (28)−(31) is stationary. The state space
of the above economy includes
³











ªi∈I appear because they determine the
t−1-period expectations of wages and proﬁti nt h ec o n s t r a i n t s(30) and (31),
respectively. Therefore, the constructed planner’s economy satisﬁes our as-
sumptions A1 and A2.6
6Under the above assumptions, there is a one-consumer model that can be constructed
analytically, see Maliar and Maliar (2003).
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